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RECENT DECISIONS
substituted in lieu thereof. This bill may decrease revenue, but it
surely will work substantial justice to all parties concerned.
The greatest calamity of this session, as of the session in 1929,
was the veto by Harry G. Leslie, Governor, of the Registration of
Voters bill. It was vetoed on the theory that it was too cumbersome
and expensive, especially in rural districts. The necessity for a registration law was admitted by practically everyone, and neither the
House nor the Senate could figure out any better or more economical
way of accomplishment than that provided by the proposed law. The
Governor, apparently, knew less than anyone about it, since he had
had two years in which to advise his party chieftains. But he proceeded to veto the bill. Its failure to be signed is a substantial loss to
every county in the state that is large in population, or that borders
on or abuts another state.
The difficulty in the present system of legislative work in Indiana
arises from many sources. Principal among them is the fact that it is
almost humanly impossible to act intelligently on 900 proposed laws
in but 61 days time. Secondly, the members of the legislature are
poorly paid. They are forced to leave a business for 60 days, or
attempt to function at the same time in two different places. Curiously enough, the item that impressed me as being a serious defect
in the House of Representatives has nothing to do with laws or
legislators. It involves the acoustics and sounding of the room itself.
Many an intelligent argument for or against a bill was never heard
three seats away from the speaker. Many communities thought they
had sent a "slicker" to the legislature, whereas they never were really
represented on the floor of the House, except in voting. The moral
of that may be, vote for a legislator with a loud voice, or then, again,
it may be that Indiana ought to spend a few dollars improving the
acoustics of the House of Representatives.
Walter E. Stanton.*
Gary, Indiana

RECENT DECISIONS
OF PuREs-INURIEs FRom O0PERATOi-PRosPECTv -- LmnLT
rom
AuTO
CHASmE
OR SALEs AENTs.--The prospective purchaser having selected an auto-

mobile and agreed on the price to be paid on installments, thereafter left the
automobile in the seller's garage. The latter testified that the agreement was that
he was to purchase the car if after the price was fully paid he found it satisfactory. While using the car on errands of his own under this arrangement, with
set of markers used by the seller on demonstration cars, he ran into the plaintiff's
decedent. Held, Dealer not liable for negligence of one operating with permission
to test whether satisfactory or not, before purchasing. Mfurphzy v. Mace, 152 At.
582 (Conn. 1930).
*LL. B., Notre Dame, 1930. State Representative, Lake County, 1931-1932.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
When the seller of a motor vehicle gives instructions in its operation to the
purchaser the seller not the purchaser is responsible for the negligent acts of
the driver giving the instructions. Likewise an automobile dealer is liable for
injuries caused by the negligence of one whom he employs to instruct customers
in driving while using the dealer's car. Opcello v. Mead, 135 At. 488 (Md. 1926).
For any negligence of the instructor in control of the car the defendant who
employed him to perform the instructions and who provided the car for the
purpose would be liable. International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 127 Ad. 647
(1925); Louis v. Johnson, 146 Md. 115 (1924). In Doyn v. Massoline Motor
Car Co., 98 N. J. L. 540, 120 Atl. 204 (1923), a salesman in the course of his
demonstration injured a pedestrian. The defendant corporation was held liable for
his negligent operation regardless of whether the salesman or the purchaser was
driving the car. It was said by the Supreme Court of Oregon, in Holmboe v.
Morgan, 69 Oregon 395, 138 Pac. 1086 (1914), that a salesman who is demonstrating an automobile to a purchaser and teaching him how to run it, as an implied consideration of the sale, was not relieved of control because he permitted the purchaser to drive the car, but was in charge of it and should have
taken control if he thought they were in a locality where the car should be in
the hands of an expert. Where a dealer's employee invited another to help him
sell a car and the employee was driving in a negligent manner as a result of
which the third person was killed, it was held that the dealer was liable for his
employee's negligence on the theory that the salesman was acting within the
scope of his authority as an agent of the dealer. Curran v. Anthony, 247 Pac.
236 (Cal. App. 1926). A later case considered whether or not this was a "joint
enterprise." The court held that a "joint enterprise" involves a community of
interests in objects of undertaking and equal rights to direct and govern movements. Bryant v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385 (1917).
See Rollison, The "Joint Enterprise" in the Law of Imputed Negligence (1931)
6 Notre Dame L. 172. Further, it was argued that the salesman was an inAependent contractor. The court held that an independent contractor is one
who, in rendering services, exercises an independent employment or occupation and
represents his employer only as to the results of his work and not as to the means
whereby it is to be accomplished. Barton v. Studebaker Corporation,46 Cal. App.
707, 189 Pac. 1025 (1920); Green v. Souly, 145 Cal. 96, 78 Pac. 337 (1904). The
court in Coonse v. Bechold, 125 N. E. 416 (1919), held that the mere fact that
a seller of an automobile retains title until price is paid, with the right to retake
possession on default, does not establish the relation of employer and employee
so as to render the seller liable for the buyer's negligence' while operating it
as a taxicab. The owner of a motor car who has placed it into the possession
of a garage keeper either as a prospective buyer, or a factor, or a sales agent,
is not liable for negligence of said garage keeper while driving the car for
demonstration there being no relation of master and servant or any other
relationship justifying the imputation of the driver's negligence. Emery v. McGombs, 180 App. Div. 225 (N. Y. 1917). A prospective purchaser, permitted by
the defendant's salesman to drive the automobile for the purpose of showing
it to his wife, was not the defendant's agent while so driving. Cruse-Crawford
Mfg. Co. v. Rucher, 123 So. 897 (Ala. 1929). The doctrine that a demonstrator is the agent of the dealer cannot be applied when the salesman in his
demonstration entrusts the car to the prospective purchaser for his own purpose
unless with knowledge of his unfitness. 2 BLASHPIE=. ENcY. or AuTromoBrr
LAw, p. 1323; Goodrich v. Musgrave Co., 154 Iowa 637, 135 N. W. 58 (1912).
The relationship of the salesman and the prospective buyer was that of a
bailment. The doctrine is that an owner of a car is generally not liable for
the consequences of the negligence of a bailee while so operating the car.
Bevelle v. Taylor, 202 Ala. 305, 80 So. 370 (1918); Gardner v. Solomon, 200
Ala. 115, L. R. A. 1917F 380 (1917); Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 43 L. R. A.
EOm
LAw, pp. 1320-1322;
(N. S.) 87 (1912); 2 BaASH7nmD ENCY. oF AuTo
2 BmuY ON AwroxoREs (6th ed.) p. 1200. Where a truck driver was furnished to operate a demonstrating truck by making delivery of goods, he is
generally held to be the servant of the owner of the truck so that the owner
is liable for any damage resulting from his negligence, even though an employee

RECENT DECISIONS
of the purchaser accompanied the truck to direct the driver as to where to
stop. McGuire v. Auto Car Sales Co., 134 N. Y. S. 702 (N. Y. 1912). Where
the chauffeur's employment was to demonstrate the car if he surrenders the
actual driving to another he is considered as acting within the scope of his
authority. Wooding v. Thorn, 148 App. Div. 21 (N. Y. 1911). A dealer has
been held liable because of chauffeur's negligence although the accident was
brought about by a defective condition of the car. Burham v. Central Auto
Exchange, 67 AtL 429 (R. I. 1907). A commission agent's authority is usually
a limited one and if a car is delivered to him it is considered as being within
his own control. Goodrich v. Musgrave Fence and Auto Co., 154 Iowa 637
(1912).
John Ruberto.

CovmANTs-Rsnucnw--As To nam NATuRE or =an OCCUPANCy-NEGROES
iND OTrHm-This is an injunction suit involving the following facts. A number
of lot owners mutually agreed that they would not permit their property to be
used or occupied by persons of either the negro, African, or Asiatic race. That
the transfer or sale of said property shall be subject to the covenants agreed
upon, and that the said covenant shall run with the land. The agreement was
recorded. The defendants are negroes who purchased with notice of the restrictions. Held, the defendants are bound by the restricting covenant, and being
members of the negro race, they are not entitled to occupy the premises so restricted. Littlejohns v. Henderson, 295 Pac. 95 (Cal. 1931).
"... the plat of land containing the restriction was of record. It was also a
part of defendant's deed. He knew or should have known all about it. He did
not have to buy the land, and he should not have bought it unless willing to
observe the restrictions contained." Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N. W.
330, 38 A. L. R. 1180 (1922). "The concrete question before us is: May the right
to occupy-and necessarily incident thereto the right to purchase and sell property-be prohibited by a law, state or municipal, solely because of the color of
the proposed occupant?" Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 16, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L.
Ed. 149, L. P. A. 1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201 (Ky. 1917); Liberty Annex
Corporationv. City of Dallas, 289 S. W. 1067; affirmed in 295 S. W. 591 (Texas
1927). Under the constitution a negro has the right to acquire, own, and occupy
property but that does not give him the power to compel a conveyance to him
of any particular private property. Corrigan v. Buckley, 55 App. D. C. 30, 299
Fed. 899 (D. C. 1924); Torrey v. Wolfes, 56 App. D. C. 4, 6 F. (2d) 702 (D. C.
1925). "A person owning a body of land, and selling a portion thereof, may, for
the benefit of his remaining land, impose upon the land granted any restrictions,
not against public policy, that he sees fit, and a court of equity will enforce
them." 7 R. C. L. 1114. A restriction in deed of occupancy and ownership to
white persons is valid. Chandler v. Ziegler, 291 Pac. 822 (Colo. 1930); Schulte
t. Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N. W. 102 (1927); Parmalee v. Morris, supra;
Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L. R. A. 1916B,
1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1248 (1915); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.
W. 217, 9 A. L. R. 107 (1918). Whether a particular covenant runs with the land
is determined by the intention in the light of surrounding circumstances of the
parties and the subject of the grant. DeSanno v. Earle, 273 Pa. 265, 117 At. 200
(1922). ". . . if the owner of land enters into a covenant concerning the land,
concerning its use, subjecting it to easements or personal servitudes, and the like,
and the land is afterwards conveyed or sold to one who has notice of the covenant, the grantee or purchaser will take the premises bound by the covenant, and
will be compelled in equity either to specifically execute it, or will be restrained
from violating it, and it makes no difference, whether the covenant is or is not
one which in law 'runs with the land." Poimoy's EQUrrY JURIPRUDNCE (4th
Ed.) Vol. 2, § 689. "In accordance with the rules stated, restrictive covenants
will be enforced in equity as covenants running with the land." 7 R. C. L. 1114.
Joseph V. Stodola.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
PPnrCIPAL AND SUREY-SURETY CAN BE SUED BEFORE SUING PRINCIPALRom=AN LAw-CoMMON LAw-STATUTORY LAw.-In this case the plaintiff brought

suit in assumpsit against the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company of
Maryland, surety on the official bond of Dallas Auvill, sheriff of Barbour County,
West Virginia. There was no statute in West Virginia requiring that the principal be sued before suit could be brought against the surety. In this action no
suit had been commenced nor had any judgment been taken against the principal, Dallas Auvill. The lower court held that the principal should have been
sued first but the Appellate court held, that the surety at common law may be
sued without first suing the principal. Downer v. Ulhited States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. of Maryland, 46 Fed. (2d) 733 (C. C. of A. 3d, 1931).
It is a well settled principle of law today that the plaintiff may issue the
surety without first suing the principal. In 32 Cyc. 91 (e) the rule is stated
as follows: "Ordinarily ii the absence of a statute, the creditor or obligee
cannot be required to resort to the principal before proceedng against the
surety, as where both principal and surety are equally bound, and the creditor
cannot be compelled in such cases to resort to other remedies before coming
on the surety, or, in the absence of statute, to attempt by execution to exhaust
his remedy against the principal before proceeding against the surety. The
surety's remedy is to pay the debt and pursue the principal for reimbursement
....
It follows that, in the absence of statute, forbearance to proceed against
the principal will not affect the right of the creditor to pursue the surety,
whatever may be the consequences of the delay, such as the subsequent insolvency of the principal or the fact that the remedy against the principal
may be lost by lapse of time." This principle is true whether the damages
be liquidated or unliquidated. Janes v. Scott, 59 Pa. 178, 98 Am. Dec. 328(1868).
The theory in support of the general rule is that a judgment against the
the principal could not be used for any purpose against his sureties. Not being
parties to the suit, they could neither defend it nor take it up for review,
and it could not be used to fix liability upon them. To bind the surety in any
way by the judgment against the principal would amount to depriving the
surety of his day in court. Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 35 (1840);
McKellar v. Bowell, 11 N. C. (4 Hawks) 34 (1825); State v. Leeds, 31 N. J.
Law, 185 (1865). This preliminary discussion has been more or less for the
purpose of restating the law as it is today in regard to this suretyship question.
Now we will confine ourselves to the evolution of this rule and pay some
attention to statutory provisions which change it.
The early Roman law gave the surety the right to compel the plaintiff to
resort first to the principal to collect his debt before suing the surety. Gradually
this rule was departed from, but Justinian re-established it, so that even today
it continues as the prevailing rule in some of the European nations. The rule
never secured a footing in England and the common law rule as developed
by the courts of that country has been that the plaintiff may sue the surety
without first suing the principal, and the surety must pay and seek reimbursement from the principal.
Some states have statutes, however, which change the common law rule
and give preference to the old Roman law. In Georgia, under the Code (§ 2154),
delay in entering judgment against a principal until he becomes insolvent discharges his surety. Hayes v. Liftle, 52 Ga. 555 (1874). In Louisiana the Revised Civil Code (art. 3066) provides that suit shall not be instituted against
a surety on an appeal bond, or on the bond of an administrator, tutor, curator,
executor, or syndic, until steps have seen taken to enforce payment against the
principal; but the sureties for a surviving partner as liquidator may be sued
without execution having been issued against the principal. Macready v. Schenck,
41 La. Ann. 456, 6 So. 517 (1889). In Texas the Revised Statutes [art. 1204
(1895)] provide that a surety may be sued without suing the principal, if the
latter is a non-resident or is dead. Art. 3814 provides that when the principal
and surety are sued together, the surety may have the property of the principal
first sold; but if the sureties have given a trust deed with the principal, and
the latter is dead, the trust deed can be foreclosed against the sureties without
postponement to foreclosure of a trust deed given by the principal alone.
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Planters',etc., Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 86 S. W. 643 (Texas Civ. App. 1905). To
entitle a surety to the privilege given by statute of not being sued first, he
must have contracted as such. Ennis v. Crump, 6 Tex. 85 (1851). The Texas
Revised Statutes (§ 1842, 1897) state that the creditor must ordinarily obtain
a judgment against the principal before proceeding against the surety. Snyder
v. Slaughter, 208 S. W. 974 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). In Indiana and Kentucky
there are statutes also restricting the rights of the creditor to sue the surety
before first suing the principal. These statutes, however, do not apply to all
cases where this relation exists but only to certain specific cases.
Kenneth J. Konop.

BOOK REVIEWS
By Adolf A.
CASEs Am MAarAi.s 3x = LAW OF CozoRAm oNoFmnAc.
Berle, Jr. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1930.
About a year ago I read with considerable interest and, profit Professor
Berle's Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance. Here was a little text (less
than two hundred pages long) which aided me far more in the particular corporate problem at hand than a number of the voluminous treatises on the subject of
corporations. Many lawyers have told me of similar experiences. And it seems
to me that Professor Berle's case-book should have the same unusual value for
J
the student that his text has had for the lawyer.
I do not pretend to know the ideal curricular requirements for the law
student. I do believe that far too many men come from law school with only
the haziest idea of the relation of theory to practice. This may partially explain
why it is generally accepted that it requires about five years for the young
lawyer to get his feet on the ground. The average organizers of corporations
have little idea of just what corporate framework will be most advantageous
for their purposes. They expect counsel to advise them of more than what they
can do; they expect counsel to guide them in what they should do.
It seems to me that up to now nearly all courses in corporation have been
devoted to a demonstration of rights under given factual situations. A knowledge of these rights is of course essential. But something more is required in
fairness to the student; namely, that at least his intellectual curiosity should
be aroused as to the most desirable form of curporate structure or financing
in relation to a given set of facts. The intelligent study and use of Professor
Berle's case-book will do this and more. It will give the student a fund of
knowledge seldom acquired by the general practitioner in a decade for practically
every problem arising with the development and growth of modern corporations is presented. Many cases will be of particular interest because their
history is still fresh in the student's mind. I feel certain that this case-book
will meet with the unqualified approval of both the professor and the student.
Aaron H. Huguenard.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.

CoapoRnn Dmacroas. By Howard Hilton Spellman. New York: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1931.
It is my sincere belief that the average lawyer's overhead is far out of proportion to his income. In the consideration of overhead I include the cost and
upkeep of library. Law book publishers have done little to assist the lawyer
in keeping down his library account. They have constantly brought out books
and most of these books are of such excellence that it has taken small effort
to sell them to the lawyer. The question of paying for them is another matter.
The more comprehensive legal treatises are quite expensive. Their value is

